Semantic Compositionality and Construal Operations: The Case of the Healthy-Noun Construction by SHIBUYA, Yoshikata
Title Semantic Compositionality and Construal Operations: TheCase of the Healthy-Noun Construction
Author(s)SHIBUYA, Yoshikata




Type Departmental Bulletin Paper
Textversionpublisher
Kyoto University
Semantic Compositionality and Construal Operations:
The Case of the Healthy-Noun Construction
Yoshikata Shibuya
University of Manchester, UK
yoshikata.shibuya@stud.man.ac.uk
1. Introduction
How do people understand phrases such as a healthy person, healthy exercise, and a healthy look? If
one claims that the meaning of the whole phrase can be gained by a simple sum of the semantics
of the component parts (i.e., the modifier healthy and the modified nouns person, exercise, and
look), the problem I would like to discuss in this paper might appear quite simple. However,
I will argue that such a "componential" view of semantics is not empirically plausible, since
comprehension of these phrases involves various construal operations that should be accounted
for with a cognitive linguistic approach as the present paper seeks.
In this paper, I will mainly discuss the semantics of the English Adjective-Noun (EAN)
construction (e.g., red pencils).! Issues of semantic compositionality of the EAN construction
range over a variety of phenomena, depending on the type of words that participate in the
combination. Thus, in this paper, in order to keep the paper within manageable proportions, we
will mainly limit ourselves to the arguments on the "Healthy-Noun" (Healthy-N) construction,
which is in a taxonomic relation with the EAN construction to which it belongs, and attempt to
reveal various interesting aspects of semantic compositionality that have not been exposed in
detail in the literature.2
The main objectives of this paper can be divided into two: 1) to show the validity of
the frame-semantic approach to the semantics of the EAN construction, and 2) to propose a
constructional approach to the theory of semantic compositionality.3 As opposed to traditionally
dominant symbolic approaches by logical and generative linguists, this paper argues that
semantic compositionality involves construal operations to resolve discrepancy between a
profile and a relevant active zone based on the frame-semantic knowledge of words and the
functional restriction imposed by the construction.
In the next section, I will introduce two different approaches, and claim that the
traditionally dominant symbolic approach is not plausible. Detailed analyses of the Healthy-N
construction will then be prOVided in sections 3, 4, and 5.
, Following the custom in Croft's (2001) Radical Construction Grammar, I will call this constTuction the English
Adjective-Noun construction, See Croft (2001: 49·51), for discussions as to the problem of labeling of a construction.
'See Croft (2001: 25-29) and Cruse and Croft (in press: chapter 12) for how the grammatical knowledge of a speaker is
represented in construction grammar.
3 Frame semantics is a semantic theory proposed by Fillmore (I 982a), where he argued that interpretation of linguistic
expressions depends on the frames (knowledge of Ule world). The frame-semantic knowledge is "shared", or 'believed
to be shared, by at least some segment of a speech community" (Taylor 1995: 89). In cognitive linguistics, similar terms to
"frames" include "domains" <Langader 1987: chapter 4) and "idealized cognitive models" (Lakoff 1987: chapter 4). Each
term is not exactly identical, but in this paper. we usc frames as the co,'er Lerm to refer to the knowledge system about
the world,
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2. Previous studies of semantic compositlonality of the EAN construction
One can divide approaches to issues on semantic compositionality roughly into two, based
on the view of meaning taken in each theory. One is what Lakoff (1987) calls the "objectivist"
approach whose view of meaning is based on the classical symbolic view. In such a classical
view, it is argued that "all rational thought involves the manipulation of abstract symbols which
are given meaning only via conventional correspondences with things in the external world"
(Lakoff 1987: xii). The other approach is the "conceptualist" approach that questions the validity
of the classical symbolic approach and instead argues that linguistic phenomena should be
studied in terms of general cognitive processes: This section introduces these two different
approaches and discusses which one is more preferable.
2.1. The objectivist approach
There are three typical analyses in the objectivist approach: 1) an analysis based on the notion
"selection(nal) restriction", 2) one based on "logical rules", and 3) one based on "syntactic rules".
In the objectivist approach, it is argued that 1) "[c]ategories are defined in terms of a
conjunction of necessary and sufficient features", 2) "[f]eatures are binary", 3) "[clategories have
clear boundaries", and 4) "[a]1I members of a category have equal status" (Taylor 1995: 23-4).5
For example, a typical objectivist analysis can be found in the early stage of generative grammar
that used the notion of selection(al) restriction (e.g., Katz and Fodor 1963; Chomsky 1965), where
it is argued that such instances as infant bachelor are not acceptable, since the binary feature [-
ADULTI of infant does not conform to the feature [+ADULTI of bachelor (Taylor 1995: 31).
The classical semantic analysis, however, suffers from several empirical facts. Fillmore,
for example, argues that the classical feature-based model cannot account for nonprototypical
examples of bachelor such as "male participants in long-term unmarried couplings", "a boy
abandoned in the jungle and grown to maturity away from contact with human society", and
'John Paul U" (Fi Ilmore 1982b: 34).
Fillmore instead argues that the noun badlelor can be defined as an unmarried man "only in
the context of a human society in which certain expectations about marriage and marriageable
age obtain" (Fillmore 1982b: 34). Understanding a word involves such an idealization, and this is
what Lakoff (1987) calls "idealized cognitive models" (lCMs).IC!'vfs (or frames) of bachelor are the
source of the recognition of interpreters as to whether an example of bachelor sounds acceptable
or not. Interpretation of an expression depends on if one's ICM of bachelor fits the world, and
hence cannot be captured by the feature-based model that simply uses binary features without
any references to the world."
The invalidity of the classical semantic approach is also posed by psychological studies
(e.g., Labov 1973, Rosch 1978). For example, Rosch and her collaborators revealed through a
series of psychological experiments, that 1) concepts have a prototype, 2) there are no necessary
and sufficient attributes to determine a category membership, and 3) a category consists of
members based on their similarity with the prototype in the category.7
Let us now look at the objectivist approach taken by logical semanticists. It is the principle
•See also Langackcr (1991'1: chapter 12) for discussions on the difference between the objectivist approach and the
conceptualist approach.
For extensive discussions at the classical symbolic approach and the alternative ,'jew, see Lakoff and Johnson (1980),
Lakolf (1987), Taylor (1995); for rei""anl discussionN particularly (rom the perspectives of AI, philosophy, and cognitive
science, see DreyfuN (1979, 1982, 1992) and Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1988).
, See Lakolf (1987: chapter 4), for more det.Uled discussions.
'See, for examp"'. Rooch and Menis (1975) and Rosch (1978).
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of compositionality, which is defined as "the meaning of a sentence is determined by the
meaning of its words C/nd by the syntactic structure in which they are combined" (Hayasaka and
Toda 1998: 126), that has been the main drive of objectivists, especially to formal logicians, to the
study of the semantics of the EAN construction.
Hayasaka and Toda, for example, based on the traditionally dominant "intersection"
analysis, note that: "Most linguists would analyze the phrase green scrccn in terms of sets.
Imagine first the set of all things that are screens; then imagine a second set, made up of all the
things that are green in color. Anything that belongs to both sets-that is, the intersection of these
two sel..-is a green screen" (Hayasaka and Tada 1998: 127). Figure 1 depicts this situation.
<Figure 1>
set of all screens set of all green things
set of all glee!' screens
-Hayasaka and Toda (1998: 127)
Formal logicians have taken the intersection analysis so influentially as the basic method.
For example, Cann (1993: 171) also follows such an analysis and provides (1) as a translation of
the EAN phrase happy stlldent.
(1) happy student =Ay [happy' (y) & student' (y)].
In order to guarantee the proposition that every student is happy and every happy student
is a student, Cann prOVides (2).
(2) happy =API [Ay [happy' (y) & PI (y)]J.
Cann notes that the expression in (2) denotes "a function that maps the set of entities denoted by
the common noun to the set of entities which appear in the intersection of this Set with the set of
entities denoted by the predicalive adjective happy' " (Cann 1993: 171).
Adjectives such as happy that are expected to be captured by the expression in (2) are
called "interseclive" adjectives. The rule (3) is a general rule that takes the predicative adjective
translation and outputs its attributive counterpart (Cann 1993: 171).
(3) If a is a predicative adjective with translation a', then its attributive counterpart
has a translation ;..p 1M [a •(x) & P (x)]].
At first glance, the intersection analysis introduced above might look reasonable. However,
this analysis is too simplistic to be a plausible model that captures the complexities of construal
operations of conceptual combination of the component words of the EAN construction.
Roughly, there are at least two practical problems and one fundamental theoretical problem that
I argue the objectiVist approach to semantic compositionality is not plausible.
A first problem is that although one needs to capture empirical facts of the semantics of
the EAN construction, this does not appear possible in the objectivist approach. For example,
it appears that the objectivist approach does not even prOVide an adequate account for their
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favorite instances consisting of a combination of an intersective adjective and a noun, such as
green screens introduced above, since it does not capture the ambiguity of this phrase.
Green screens is semantically ambiguous as to whether the objects in question refer to
screens that have a green ribbon on them in order for one to differentiate from other red-colored
screens, or they refer to those originally painted in green paint but now look yellowish as the
strong sunshine has caused them to fade, and so forth. As mentioned above, in the objectivist
analysis by logical semanticists, the meaning of green screens is claimed to be captured by
the intersection analysis. However, the semantics of this expression is indeed not as simple
as formal logicians expect. In reality, it involves much more complex conceptualization, as
cognitive linguists such as Langacker (1991b) and Sweetser (1999) suggest. Such construal
operations do not seem to be captured in the objectivist approach in an empirically plausible
way, since this approach does not take into consideration underlying cognitive processes to
account for flexible construal operations as the conceptualist approach does.
A second problem with the objectivist approach concerns the classification of adjectives.
Cann classifies adjectives into two groups: intersective adjectives and intensional adjectives.
According to him, intersective adjectives incbde such adjectives as happy. On the other hand,
according to him, intensional adjectives include adjectives such as fake as in afake gun. Cann
notes that the rule (3) cannot capture such examples consisting of intensional adjectives as afake
gun (since it is not a gun) and an alleged murder (since it does not necessarily refer to a murderer).
He simply writes: ''The interpretation of all these adjectives goes beyond the extensional
semantics that has so far been developed and requires a definition of intensionality" (Cann 1993:
172).
I argue that such a classification of adjectives is a type of methodological opportunism.s It
simply shows what kind of adjectives can (and cannot) be described in the logical analysis, and
does not offer us any further perspectives.
Essentially, this classification is indeed not plausible, since it misses a semantic difference
of the same adjective with a different head noun. For example, happy, an intersective adjective
by Cann's classification, does not seem to be classified as such in examples such as a happy
suggestion, where it is not the suggestion itself that is happy, and the proposition that every
suggestion is happy and every happy suggestion is a suggestion cannot be guaranteed, unlike a
happy student.
It is possible to call happy in ahappy suggestion an intensional adjective ~d happy in a happy
student an intersective adjective. Yet, without prOViding any rigorous criterion or principles
for such classification, the logical analysis as presented by Cann remains ad hoc. A rigorous
semantic theory must provide some principled accounts for the semantics of adjectives. In fact,
the second problem of the logical approach concerns the functional differences between the
EAN construction and the English Predicative Adjective (EPA) construction (e.g., l1,ese pencils
are red.), whose schema is [Sbj be Adj]. In the logical analysis introduced above, such a functional
difference between the two constructions is ignored.
The same problem of neglect of a functional difference between the two constructions
can be found in the generative approach. In the early transformational grammar, important
theoretical constructs included such notions as "surface/ deep structures" and "transformations".
For example, Lakoff introduced one of the typical treatments proposed in the 70s to account
for the derivation of the EAN construction as follows: 'There are two rules in English which
are necessary to derive the common adjectival construction that appears in the tall man from
• See Croft (2001) for aitiques of methodological opportunism in linguistic investigation.
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relative c1iluses like tlte man who is tall. The first rule, call it WH-DEL, deletes the sequence WH
+ PRONOUN + BE when preceded by a noun and followed by either an adjective or a verb
(adjective/verb). WH-DEL will convert the man who is tall into tile man tall, .... Following WH-
DEL, there is an obligatory rule which converts the man tall into the tallman. Call this ADJ-
SHIIT' (Lakoff 1970: 122).
Such a transformational analysis also suffers from various empirical problems. As Bolinger
(1967) points out, there are many instances that do not conform to such rules. For example,
consider the following examples (cited from Bolinger 1%7: 2-3).
(4) a. the main reason; • The reason is main.
b. a total stranger; • The stranger is total.
(5) a. an angry storm; • The storm is angry.
b. il medical man; • The man is medical.
(6) a. The man is asleep; • an asleep man
b. The girl is sorry; • a sorry girl
In (4), it is shown that some adjectives never occur in the EPA construction, and thus do not
conform to the transformational rule introduced above. Likewise, the examples in (5) show that
there are some adjectives that allow particular uses in the EAN construction but do not occur in
the EPA construction: they lack il predicative counterpart. The examples in (6) show the opposite
situation. That is, there are some adjectives that occur in the EPA construction, but not in the
EAN construction (at least not in the same sense). These examples show the invalidity of the
transformational analysis, since they manifest the fact that many if not all instances do not have
a predicative/ attributive counterpart. Instead, these examples suggest different constructional
functions between the EAN and EPA constructions.
Bolinger ilrgues that the functional difference between the two constructions is ilscribed
to the difference between "characteristic" and "occasion". For example, regarding the examples
in (7) (cited from Bolinger 1967: 3-4), he notes that while (7a) is ambiguous as to whether it tells
the temporary states of rivers (the only river that happens to be navigable at the moment) or the
classes of rivers, (7b) unambiguously refers to occasion, and (7c) unambiguously refers to the
characteristic <Bolinger 1967: 3-4).
(7) a. The only river that is navigable is to the north.
b. the only river navigable
c. the only navigable river
In the generative analysis (as well as the logical analysis), such a functional difference
between the EAN and EPA constructions is ignored. Therefore, the generative approach
cannot capture instances that do not conform to the rules they propose. As opposed to the
objectivist approach, I argue that one needs to study the functional difference between the two
constructions in order to ilchieve fine-grained analyses of semantic compositionality of the EAN
construction. The constructional properties play crucial roles in acceptability and interpretability
of expressions. In this paper, section 5 discusses the constructional properties of the two
constructions.
A third problem with the objectivist approach is a fundamental problem that causes the
two prilctical problems discussed above. This problem concerns the validity of the principle of
compositionality itself. The theoretical assumption of the principle of compositionillity from
which the objectivist approach such as the intersection analysis starts is as follows:
If there were no direct relation between lexical and sentential meaning, of course, the
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meaning of each sentence in a language would have to be listed. Since the number of
sentences that make up a language is infinite, this would mean that no human being
would be able to determine the meanings of all the sentences of any language owing
to the finite resources of the brain. This is absurd, of course, and just as sentences are
defined recursively by syntactic rules, taking words (or morphemes) as their basis, so
their meanings should also be defined recursively from the meanings ascribed to the
lexemes they contain (Cann 1993: 3).
That there should be a certain relation between lexical and sentential meaning is logically
true, since otherwise, as Cann writes, one would have to list all the meanings of each sentence
in the brain, and this is empirically impossible. I suggest, however, that formal logicians such
as Cann make a fatal mistake here in ascribing the relation between lexical and sentential
properties to symbol-manipulation rules. This is the crucial fundamental error made by formal
logicians and generative grammarians, whose view of semantics has been based on the classical
symbolic view.
As mentioned, Cann correctly notes that the formal semantics model needs more
sophistication as to the treatment of different adjective types. He, however, still seems to have
a firm belief in the explanatory power of such a formal model. Cann writes: 'The analysis of
intersective adjectives given here is just a beginning, but it gives a ba~is from which to start"
(Cann 1993: 172). This demonstrates that Cann does not question the fundamental limitations
of the objectivist approach, on which his model has been (and will be) built. The present paper
questions the theoretical validity of the objectivist approach. It appears that such theoretical
constructs as rules and arbitrary classification of adjectives result from the firm belief towards
the objectivist approach. In this paper, following the above discussions about the problems the
classical approach suffers from, we will not follow the objectivist approach.
22. The conceptualist approach
As opposed to the objectiVist approach introduced in the preceding section, cognitive linguists
(e.g., Langacker 1987, 1991a, 1991 b; Sweetser 1999) argue that the objectivist approach to
semantic compositionality is not plausible. They argue that conceptual combination of the
component words of the EAN construction involves various construal operations, which cannot
be captured with the symbolic view taken in the classical approach.
In cognitive linguistics, one takes what Langacker (1991a: 515) calls the "conceptualist"
view of meaning as a central theorem of semantics, and the principle of compositionality is
given a new perspective. It is argued that the meaning of the whole expression is more than
the simple sum of meaning of the component parts. For example, in cognitive grammar,
Langacker says: "In general, only partial compositionality can be assumed (as opposed to the full
compositionality implied by the metaphorical view of component structures as building blocks)"
(Langacker 1991a: 546). Behind semantic composition are complex construal operations that
are ascribed to cognitive processes. Let us introduce one of the important theoretical devices in
cognitive grammar that describes linguistic phenomena in terms of general cognitive processes.
Interpreting a given expression often requires a process to identify the entity that is not
linguistically denoted but directly participates in the predication. Langacker notes: "a highly
prominent substructure within the profile (i.e. the trajector or primary landmark) does not
precisely coincide with the entity that participates most directly and crucially in the designated
relation" (Langacker 1987: 271). Langacker introduces the notion "active zones" to capture such
a construal operation by the conceptualizer who fills in a "discrepancy" between the profile and
the entity (active zone) that is directly involved in the predication (see Langacker 1987: 271-274).
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Active zones are defined as "[tlhose facets of an entity capable of interacting directly with
a given domain or relation" (Langacker 1987: 272). Processes regarding identification of an
active zone can be found not only in interpretation of the EAN construction, but also in other
constructions. Consider the following examples (cited from Langacker 1987: 271).
(8) a. We all heard the trumpet.
b. Don't ever believe Gerald.
c. I finally blinked.
d. Bring me a red pencil.
For example, in (8a), it is the sound emitted by the trumpet and not a physical object of trumpet
that impinges on our auditory apparatus and thus is called the active zone. In (8b), it is not
the person called Gerald but the proposition itself (i.e., what Gerald says) that the process of
believing pertains to and is the active zone. Likewise, in (8c), it is not the body as a whole but
the eye or eyelid that is directly involved by blinking and is the active zone.
In (8dt an EAN phrase, which directly concerns with our discussions in this paper, the
relations between the profile and active zones differ from those in (8a-c). In this case, either the
outer surface of the pencil or the marks it creates when used for writing can be an active zone,
because the trajector pencil is the writing implement whose active zone, in this case a color
sensation, can be associated with either the outer surface or the marks it leaves on paper. A
similar analysis can be found in Langacker (l991b), in which he writes: 'The phrase red pen is
ambiguous, and its ambiguity hinges precisely on the choice of active zone for pen with respect
to the color predication. On the one hand, the active zone may be the color sensation associated
with the outer surface of the pen ...; on the other hand, it may be the sensation associated with
the marks left on the page when the pen is used as a writing implement" (Langacker 1991b: 192).
As well as Langacker, Sweetser follows a conceptualist approach and argues that a simple
EAN construction such as red apple requires "a broad range of cognitive mechanisms (including
metaphor, metonymy, frames, mental spaces, active zones and profiling, and implicit evocation
of the speaker's episternic and communicative spaces)" (Sweetser 1999: 129).
The conceptualist approach to the semantics of the EAN construction taken by Langacker
and Sweetser is crucially different from that of the logical and generative analyses based on the
objectivist view of semantics. In the objectiVist view, it is argued that meaning of an expression
can be gained by the manipulation of symbols. In this symbolic view, it is argued that "!>ymbols
get their meaning via a correspondence with the world, objectively construed, that is, independent
of the understanding of any organism" (Lakoff 1987: xii). On the other hand, in the conceptualist
approach, meaning is identified with conceptualization, which is "ultimately to be explicated in
terms of cognitive processing" (Langacker 1991a: 4).
The preceding section introduced two practical problems that the objectivist approach
suffers from. Let us discuss, in the remainder of this section, how the conceptualist approach
solves these problems.
The first problem concerns the treatment of semantic ambiguity shown by instances like
green screens. The conceptualist approach, unlike the objectivist approach, captures flexible
conceptualization of instances such as red pencils as well as green screens, with the notions "active
zones and profiles" as introduced above. The conceptualist approach thus seems to provide a
solution to the first problem of the objectivist approach.
As the second problem with the objectivist approach, I pointed out that the objectivist
approach does not account for any functional difference between the EAN and EPA
constructions, and argued that such constructional properties need to be captured. Langacker
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(1991 b) introduces the notion "constructional schemas". Langacker writes: "A constructional
schema represents a conventionally established pattern of bipolar integration. It is abstracted
from some array of specific expressions and embodies the commonality observable in their
formation; hence it captures any generalizations inherent in the data, can be used as a template
for the assembly of novel expressions on the same pattern, and provides a basis for assessing
their conventionality (well-formedness)" (Langacker 1991b: 298). Instead of appealing to various
arbitrary symbolic rules in order to deri ve the EAN construction, using constructional schemas
for linguistic analysis seems cognitively more realistic and theoretically preferable. By virtue of
such advantages, one can describe the semantic relations of the components of this construction
from the perspectives of the general cognitive processes of categorization and schematization.
In order to avoid the second problem of the objectivist approach, this paper uses the notion
constructional schemas as an important theoretical device.
3. Basic schemas of the Healthy-Noun construction
The previous section introduced the cognitive linguistics analysis of instances such as red
pencils. In the remainder of the paper, we will chiefly focus our attention to the semantics of the
Healthy-N construction. The reason why this paper examines the Healthy-N construction is
that this construction shows us various interesting phenomena, including metaphor, metonymy,
frames, and constructional function, which basic EAN phrases such as red pencils analyzed
by Langacker do not offer us. Let us begin with examples that elaborate basic constructional
schemas of this construction.
3.1. Prototypical schema
Instances elaborating the prototypical schema of this construction are those as in (9) below.
In this type, what is referred to by the expression is the state of the referent's being free from
illness.
(9) a. According to wholistic practitioners, a healthy animal does not have
fleas because its immune system is in proper working order and fleas
are not attracted to a healthy animal, they prey on the sick and weak.
[www.shamanshop.com/PawCares/fleas.htmIJ (found in the GOOGLE
search engine)
b. You could not think of her as sick, as old, as anything but young and vigorous
and vivid, as full of energy as a healthy baby that kicks its dresses into rags
and wears out the strength of its strapping nurse. [Conflict: 60J
The referents denoted by the head nouns in the examples of (9) are classified as ANIMAL and
HUMAN, which are both subsumed under the category ORGANISM.
Biologically, ORGANISM not only includes creatures but also plants. As shown below,
those classified as PLAJ'\IT also occur in this construction.
(10) a. Some, such as froghoppers ("cuckoo spit") and flea beetles, cause little more
than cosmetic damage and will be tolerated by healthy plants. [BNC: AOG
2462]
b. The mystery virus, it was thought, would spread into the healthy tree,
causing that too to become diseased. [BNC: AIM 196J
Prototypical instances of this construction include not only those above, but also such as
follows:
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(11) a. As you can see a healthy heart has to work half as much to get the same
amount of oxygen to your body. Iwww.fathersworld.com/health/ 98(4/)
(found in the GOOGLE search engine)
b. The increasing use of dental and oral care preparations, and especially
their use in combination, proves that there is a mounting interest in having
heal thy teeth and correct oral hygiene. Iwww.gaba.com/teeth_carel
healthy_teeth.html) (found in the COOGLE search engine)
The examples in (11) refer to the health condition of the referents, although in this case unlike (9)
and (10), each referent is classified as ORGAN that is a part of the body of a living thing.
Referring to the health condition of a referent is not restricted to the physical property of
an object. Depending on the object chosen, one can also refer to the mental state of the referent,
as shown in the following examples.
(12) a. If one of your friends lost this amount of weight from one Christmas to the
next, changed from a fat person into a slim and healthy person, you would
certainly notice! IBNC: ADO 1617]
b. Positive symptoms refers to the behaviour a person with schizophrenia exhibit
which is not normally present in a healthy person, such as: ... Iwww.lilly.ie/
marketingI schizophrenia.htm] (found in the GOOGLE search engine)
Whether healthy person denotes either a physical or a mental property of the referent must be
resolved in each context. For example, by virtue oi the contextual effects, healt11y person in (12a)
refers to the health condition of the referent in terms of its physical property, whereas in (12b) it
refers to the mental property of the referent.9
The semantics of such examples as above is to denote the state of a referent in question that
is free from illness. The schema of this type can be depicted sketchily as follows.
<Figure 2>
10K01
In Figure 2, X enclosed in the left circle in heavy line denotes the referent denoted by the head
noun (i.e., the object profiled in the construction). On the other hand, the letter I endosed in the
right circle is the abbreviation for illness. Note that this figure contains an imaginary obstacle
between X and I that stops effects (denoted by an arrow) from I to X, by which it depicts that X
is free from illness. The schema in Figure 2 is not meant to capture only the physical health of
the referent. In fact, it is supposed to capture both the physical and mental health of a referent.
It does not specify the effects of I (illness) to be either physical or mental illness. Based on the
observations so far, we can characterize the semantic structure of the prototypical type of this
construction as IX that is physicallyI mentally free from illness].
Since the referent denoted by the head noun of this type is a living thing, we can describe
the prototypical schema of the Healthy-N construction as [HEALTHY LIVING THING). Yet, I
wish to emphasize urgently that characterizing the prototypical schema as such does not mean
• An important question remains open. That is, when did healthy begin to be used to refer to a mental property in the
history of English? This teads to a historical investigation of the conceptual development of heal/hy. In thi. p.lper, I will
ignore this problem. Del.1iled .t"dies on conceptual development will be pro,'ided in my future lVork.
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to revive a semantic analysis similar to the one such as the classical selection(al) restriction
analysis based on the classical theory of categorization introduced in section 2. Note, as already
discussed in section 2, that such a feature-based approach is not empirically and psychologically
plausible.
For example, given such an objectivist approach, one would analyze the semantics of the
Healthy-N construction as follows. That is, the combination of healthy and a noun is guaranteed
if the noun is classified as a living thing, I+LlVING THING], since the adjective has a feature
[+UVING THING]. However, such a classical symbolic approach cannot capture actual flexible
conceptualization that plays a crucial role for interpretation and acceptability judgment of a
given expression of this construction. Let us discuss the actual situation as to interpretation of
this construction with some more examples where head noun referents seem to be classified as
LIVING THING.
In the classical theory, one would predict such nouns classified as LIVING THING
occur as a head in the Healthy-N construction. The fact is, however, more complicated. Note,
for example, that while one can say healthy dogs, healthy cats, it is not natural to say healthy
cockroaches, healthy amoeba. Furthermore, while it sounds natural to say healthy nails, healthy hair,
as well as healthy teeth (llb), it is odd to say healthy beard, healthy earlobe, and healthy bellybuHoll,
despite the fact that the referents denoted by the head nouns all belong to the body as ORGAN.
What underlies such acceptability judgments among these instances? One cannot capture
this problem with the classical categorization theory. What is suggested here is that problems
as to acceptability of the EAN construction go much deeper than the objectivist approach might
expect. How should such facts be analyzed?
I argue that the preferable analysis of these examples is a frame-semantic analysis.
Frames are "configurations of culture-based, conventionalized knowledge" (Taylor 1995: 89).
Interpretation of words is not to be achieved independently of the flexible construal operations
of the conceptualizer. Interpretation requires encyclopedic frame knowledge about the world
and the flexible conceptualization processes.
I argue that interpretation and acceptability of those Healthy-N phrases as given above
concern what might be called the HEALTH frame. The reason why healthy nails, healthy hair,
and healthy teeth do not normally sound odd is that the HEALTH frame tells us that the health
condition of the objects denoted by the head mailers to us. Frames reflect the knowledge of
the world. Since in the world (or society) where we live, the state of nails, hair, and teeth are
considered to be informative, such nouns can occur in this construction. Conversely, since the
HEALTH frame tells us that the state of the referent in healthy beard, healthy ear/abe, and healthy
bellybutton is not informative (since the health of the referent is not normally significant in our
life), these phrases sound somewhat odd. Whether one sees X as informative or not depends on
his/her conceptualization and the frames that one obtains in the environment where they live.
Taylor argues against the classical categorization model based on the feature theory
that uses binary features and argues that "the grammaticality of word combinations is
strictly a matter of either-or". Taylor instead suggests: "Acceptability is also ,1 function of
interpretability, given certain background knowledge. To the extent that an expression is
interpretable, it will be accepted as well formed; otherwise will be rejected" (Taylor 1995: 92).
The frame-semantic approach does not provide such either-or treatment as to acceptability. The
underlying motivation of correlation between acceptability and interpretability is the flexible
conceptualization based on the frame semantics of words.
The frame-semantic approach can also capture contextual effects on acceptability. For
example, healthy beard is not as readily acceptable as healthy hair, but it would be acceptable if
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given such a context as (13) below.
(13) However, the process of growing a beard proved to be unexpectedly arduous
and John looked around the stores for a shampoo product that would ease
the discomfort and promote a healthy beard. [www.beardshampoo.com/
Esoterica.html) (found in the GOOGLE search engine)
This suggests that the conceptualizer, thanks to the context, detects particular semantic aspects
(e.g., sheen of it) in the referent of beard, and thus is able to interpret such an expression as
informative to denote the health condition of such aspects of the object. Acceptability of an
expression is highly susceptible to conceptualization, a context, or perhaps even to a speech
community where one obtains his/ her frames about the referent denoted by a word.
Given the above argument that acceptability of this construction depends on whether the
health condition of the object denoted by the head noun is of interest or importance for the
conceptualizer, it is easy to expect that objects such as internal organs to which human beings
tend to pay attention in order to stay healthy should be likely to occur in this construction.
In fact, it seems to be the case. For example, it is felicitous to say healthy stomacll, healthy
lungs, healthy intestines, healthy kidneys, }Iealthy brains, and healthy blood vessels. People have the
encyclopedic frame knowledge that keeping objects such as internal organs in a healthy !>iate is
crucial for one's health, and hence it is worth referring to the health condition of such objects.
Therefore, it might be the case that in a society where one is not aware of the importance of
internal organs as to the health condition of him/herself (e.g., due to the lack of contemporary
knowledge of medical science or religious belief), equivalent expressions to the English
Healthy-N phrases presented as above might not be acceptable.
Reflection of such flexible conceptualization processes as to acceptability of an expression
is also found in other examples such as (9a). Given the above arguments, I argue that organisms
that are categorizable as pets or those to be kept in a breeding ground are likely to elaborate this
schema, since the heallh condition of such liVing things are of great interest for owners. In fact,
observe that healthy dogs, healthy cats, healthy horses, and healthy beetles (in the context that they
are kept by humans) all sound acceptable, while instances such as healthy cockroaches, healthy
fleas, healthy amoeba, and healthy parasite do not sound felicitous. This is because the referents of
the latter class are usually not categorizable as pets or living things that are kept by a human
being.
Of course, like healthy beetles in the former class, the latter phrases could be acceptable
depending on the person. For example, for biologists the latter phrases should be more readily
interpretable. In fact, healthy amoeba sounds natural in a context as (14) below, where the health
condition of the referent is considered informative.
(14) A healthy Amoeba is quite active, extending pseudopodia in all directions and
creeping along the slide. [http://www.science.smith.edu/departments/Biology /
Bioll1/Labmanual/OlCEL15.htm] (found in the GOOGLE search engine)
Whether it is about a body part or the whole organism, the fundamental principle as to
acceptability is the same: what matters to interpretation of a given expression is the frame-
semantic knowledge of words that tells the conceptualizer if the expression is informati ve.
The observation as to interpretability and acceptability of the EAN construction as noted
above would not be provided from the objectivist approach, since the classical theory does not
account for the "informativeness" of a referent. Such an epistemic aspect of the conceptualizer is
to be captured by the frame-semantic approach.
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The findings here arc also beyond the scope of the prototype theory, since the flexible
mode of conceptualization does not conform to the natural hierarchical categories as suggested
in this theory. Categorization involves what Barsalou (1983) calls "ad hoc" categories that are
constructed by the conceptualizer to achieve certain goals. For example, if given a category
out of context that consists of children, jewelry, portable television sets, photograph albums,
manuscripts, and oil paintings, one would perhaps find it difficult to see conceptual coherence
in these objects, but in the context "things to take out of one's home during a fire", it would
become coherent (Medin and Wattenmaker 1987: 26). Existence of such "goal-derived categories"
shows the limitation of the prototype theory. Whether or not one regards the health condition
of an object as informative depends on the conceptualizer's subjective categorization, and this
is highly context-dependent. As Medin and Wattenmaker suggest, "concepts are coherent to the
extent that they fit people's background knowledge or naive theories of the world" (Medin and
Wattenmaker 1987: 25).
As noted in section 2.1, the prototype theory claims that a category consists of members
based on their similarity with the prototype in the category. However, as Medin and
Wattenmaker (1987) argue, the prototype theory is also inadequate in this respect, because it
uses the term "similarity" without giving any clear definition of the notion of similarity. This
paper avoids the term similarity. What matters is perception of "relevance". Perception of
relevance is the crucial motivation for categorization including extensions and schematization,
and this is achieved based on the frame-semantic knowledge as argued in this section.
3.2. Metaphorical extension
The previous section discussed the prototypical schema of the Healthy-N construction that
denotes the state of X's being free from illness. This construction also involves examples
that are metaphorically motivated. This section briefly discusses metaphorical issues of this
construction. Allhough much more detailed studies on the metaphorical phenomenon need to
be developed, the objective in this section is simply to introduce some metaphorical schemas
involved in this construction.
The following examples in (15) differ from those discussed in the preceding section in that
they are metaphors, and interpretation of these involves a metaphorical mapping.
(15) a. The ideal of beauty and normality cannot perish in a healthy society; and for
this reason you ought to let art go its own way and be confident that it will
not go astray ... [BNC: AlB 1420]
b. A healthy ecosystem is one that is diverse, sustainable, and balanced; an
unhealthy one is one that lacks one or another of these characteristics. [BNC:
B(4664)
c. Healthy business, and integration of the Midland main line into the HST
network, saw most of the fixed rakes expanded to eight vehicles. [BNC: A11
1550)
In (15), referents denoted by head nouns are not classifiable as UVING THING in the biological
sense, but are in the metaphorical sense. The example in (15a) involves the metaphorical
mapping from the ILL'JESS domain (source domain) to the SOCIAL domain (target domain).
Likewise, (15b) involves the metaphorical mapping from the ILLNESS domain to the
ECOLOGICAL domain. In (1Sc), the mapping from the ILLNESS domain is mapped onto the
COMMERCIAL domain.lo
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Metaphors in the Healthy-N construction are not restricted to those types in (15). For
example, one can find an example as in (16).
(16) We can isolate it there, and we can save what's left in the tanks and we can run on
the f;ood cell. You close 'em, you can't open 'em again. You can't land on the moon
with one healthy fuel cell. [APOLLO 13: transcript]
The example in (16) shows a metaphorical mapping from the ILLNESS domain to the
MECHANICAL domain. It is the mechanical state of a thing (fuel cell) that is referred to with
the word healthy (i.e., the thing that is free from mechanical troubles).
In the previous section, I characterized the prototypical schema as [HEALTHY LIVING
THING). The metaphorical schema discussed in this section can be characterized as [HEALTHY
NONLIVING THINGj, under which such schemas as [HEALTHY SOCIAL SYSTH-1j,
[HEALTHY ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM], [HEALTHY COMMERCIAL SYSTEM), and [HEALTHY
MECHANICAL SYSTEM) are subsumed.
Of course, as well as the instances discussed in the previous section, it is not true that
anything classified as NONLIVING THING can occur in this construction. Acceptability of
metaphorical expressions also depends on whether or not the conceptualizer regards the
health condition of the referent as informative. For example, it is felicitous to say lIealtlly planet
to denote the earth we live on, but it is infelicitous to talk about the health condition of other
remote planets such as lIealthy Neptune, healtlly Uranlls, or even a closer one such as healtlly
moon, unless prOVided a particular context that activates one's interest in health condition of the
referent. Here, the metaphorical mapping to the ECOLOGICAL domain as in (ISb) is involved,
but the acceptability depends on whether one is interested in the health condition of the referent.
The semantic structure of the superordinate schema [HEALTHY NONLIVING THING)
of this metaphorical type is [X which is functioning well being free from troubles). This
superordinate schema involves several sub-schemas. The semantic structure of [HEALTHY
SOCIAL SYSTEM] is [X that is free from bad social factors]. The semantic structure of
[HEALTHY ECOLOGICAL SYSTEM) is [X that is ecologically balanced], Likewise, the semantic
structure of [HEALTHY COMMERCIAL SYSTEM) is [X that is commercially successful
(growing»). Finally, the semantic structure of [HEALTHY fv1ECHANICAL SYSTEM] is [X that is
free from mechanical troubles).
It is not true that objects categorized as NONLIVING THING always elaborate the
metaphorical schema as introduced above. For example, one does not interpret a Healthy-N
phrase whose head noun is exercise in the metaphorical way as discussed in this section.
Expressions such as healthy exercise elaborate a result-oriented schema. The ability of choosing
a different schema is driven by flexible conceptualization based on the frames of an object.
Detailed discussions of will be proVided in section 4.
4. More complex schemes of the Heelthy-N construction
Section 3 discussed instances that elaborate the basic schemas. The Healthy-N construction
involves schemas that do not conform to the schemas discussed so far. This section studies such
examples.
4.1. Langacker's active-zone analysis
Earlier, I noted that in cognitive grammar it is possible to capture a different function betwecn
two constructions by thc notion constructional schemas. In this section, I will mainly discuss
.. For the metaphor theory in cognitive 6emantics, see e.g. Lakoff:md Johnson (1980), Lakoff (19\10, 1993).
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the semantics of the Healthy-N construction in terms of constructional schemas. Let us begin
by introducing Langacker's treatment of the EAN construction from the perspective of the
constructional schema.
As mentioned in 2.2, Langacker (1991b) introduces the notion constructional schemas that
represent a conventionally established pattern of bipolar integration. For example, Langacker




















The constructional schema in Figure 3 reflects the commonality of the £AN phrases in (17).
The internal organization of a constructional schema and that of the expressions from which the
constructional schema is extracted are practically the same, apart from the difference in level of
specificity. Figure 4 depicts the semantic and phonological poles of the composite structure of
yellaw balloon in (17a), which elaborates the constructional schemas in Figure 3.u
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11 figure 3(a) indicates the semantic pole. and Figure 3(b) indica!"" the phonological pole. :>iote thaI this paper doe. nol
discuss the phonological pole.
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Observe that, at the semantic pole of Figure 3 and 4, integration is caused "by a
correspondence between the adjectival trajector and the nominal profile" (Langacker (1991b:
299). At the semantic pole of Figure 4(a), the landmark, labeled Y, is characterized as the yellow
region of color space. The dashed arrow indicates the profiled relationship to characterize one
of coincidence between the landmark region and a color sensation that is associated with the
trajector. The dotted line indicates the correspondence of the trajector of [YELLOW) to the
profile of [BALLOON], while the solid arrow indicates that [BALLOON) elaborates [YELLOW)'s
schematic trajector. Conceptual fusion of the composite structure is obtained by superimposing
the specifications of the elements.
As mentioned in 2.2, it is argued in cognitive grammar that a constructional schema
"captures any generalizations inherent in the data, can be used as a template for the assembly of
novel expressions on the same pattern, and provides a basis for assessing their conventionality
(well-formed ness)" (Langacker 1991b: 298). The commonalities among the instances such as
yellow balloon, clever boy, and large mansion in (17) which elaborate the schema in Figure 3 are as
follows:
(18) a. The profile and the active zone both refer to the same object; the profiled
object and the active zone cannot exist independently of each other.
b. They occur both in the EAN construction and the EPA construction (see, for
example, a clever boy vs. The boy is clever.).
Examples elaborating the basic schemas discussed so far appear to conform to the "same
pattern" as those elaborating the constructional schema of Figure 3 provided by Langacker, since
they conform to the commonalities listed in (18). Note that, for example, a healthy baby refers to
the health condition of a baby, and it is possible to say the baby is healthy.
I argue that the constructional schema of Figure 3 by Langacker is the prototypical schema
of the EAN construction. Yet, the EAN construction involves, as will be argued in the following
sections, instances that do not share the commonalities possessed by the instances in (18) or
those discussed in section 3, and do not conform to the constructional schema in Figure 3.
According to Langacker's characterization of constructional schemas, a different pattern among
instances means the involvement of a different constructional schema. In order to attain a fine-
grained description of the EAN construction, we need to provide a more sophisticated treatment
of constructional schemas that this construction involves. The following sections will attempt to
attain this goal.
4.2. Metonymic extension
Let us first see the examples in (19) below, which do not conform to the schemas of the
Healthy-N construction as discussed so far. The examples in (19) elaborate the schema that is
metonymically motivated.
(19) a. He had a healthy look, with a weather-beaten face, his face corrugated,
especially the large nose. [English traits: 927)
b. He had a healthy colour in his cheeks, and his face, though lined, bore few
traces of anxiety. [Two cities: 23)
c. Does the world of good, gives them a healthy tan, makes them feel fantastic.
IBNC: AMD 69J
" Here, I show both the semantic and phonological poles, but in this paper, as nOled, we will not discuss the
phonological pole.
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The semantic structure of this schema is IX which indicates Y's being free from illness)
(X=referent, Y=unprofiled participant). This is a metonymic extension from the prototypical
schema introduced in 3.1 whose semantic structure is IX that is physically / mentally free from
illness).
The relation between the adjective Ilealthy and the referent denoted by the head noun in
(l9) differs from that in Figure 2. Observe that this schema involves one profiled participant
and one "unprofiled" participant, while the prototypical schema involves only one profiled
participant. Of course, as mentioned earlier, there is no exae! matching of a profile to the active
ZOne as we saw in examples such as (8d). The point here is, however, that the schema by
Langacker cannot be used to capture the examples in (19) in a similar fashion, since they involve
an unprofiled participant, unlike (3d) and the examples discussed in sectiOn 3. This is a crucial
semantic difference between the two schemas. Such a difference needs to be captured.
Furthermore, the difference between the instances in (19) and the instances elaborating
the prototypical schema can be found in its ability to occur in the EPA construction, as noted in




?Her look is healthy.
?The colour is healthy.
?The tan is healthy.
Conversely, it is possible to put in the EPN construction such instances as yellow balloon, cJroer




The balloon is yellow.
The boy is clever.
His man!>ion is large.








Those animals are healthy.
The baby is healthy.
These plants are healthy.
d. The tree was healthy.
Her heart is healthy.
His teeth are healthy.
That person is healthy.
As mentioned, this paper regards the functional difference between the EAN construction
and the EPA construction as highly significant. In Langacker's active-zone analysis, the
metonymic sense would be placed inside the predicate. That is, the metonymic sense of Ilealthy
in the examples in (19) is treated as a new predicate type whose trajector is the active zone of
the "real" denotation of the predicate. If such an analysis by Langacker were correct, one would
expect this predicate type to be available for the same predicate in different constructions, e.g.,
the EPA construction. However, this is not the case. As shown in (20), the metonymic sense of
healthy in (19) is not available in the EPA construction, whereas the prototypical sense is. This
implies that it is a property of the construction, not any element of the construction (William
Croft, personal communication). The difference in acceptability depending on the construction
as we saw above manifests relational difference between the adjective and the noun in question.
If the two (adjective and noun in the EAN construction) have a different semantic relation, the
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analyzer should not treat the examples in the same fashion as Langacker does for the examples
in (17).
Then, what is the difference between the instances elaborating the prototypical schema
and those in (19) elaborating the metonymically motivated schema? I argue that it is ascribed
to the difference as to relational depth of adjective and noun. In other words, it is the degree of
discrepancy between a reference point (profile) and an active zone that causes such a different
behavior behveen the examples as shown in (20), (21) and (22). In the examples of (17), the
discrepancy between the profile and its active zone seems "smaller" than that of (19). What do I
mean by "smaller"? How do we measure it? Let us discuss this matter in more detail.
The depth of discrepancy derives from the relation between profile and active zone. In
the former, since the object denoted by the profile and the actual active zone refers to the same
object, the profiled object and the active zone cannot exist independently of each other. For
example, whatever the active zone of red pen is, the profile and the active zone still refer to the
same object (i.e., a pen). Conversely, in the latter, the profile is not the inherent property of the
unprofiled participant (active zone). Note, for example, that one can get a tan or lose it, but
remains the same person. In other words, the depth of discrepancy between a profile and an
active zone is measured by the degree of inherence of the property to the object in question.
The different behavior as to acceptability in the EAN construction and the EPA construction
derives from the depth of discrepancy. The fact that both the examples in (17) and those in (19)
occur in the EAN construction, while the laller instances do not occur in the EPA construction
suggests a functional difference between the two constructions that concerns the depth of
discrepancy. In the EAN construction, one can interpret an expression with comparatively
bigger discrepancy between the profile and the active zone, whereas it is not possible in the
EPA construction. It appears that a smaller discrepancy is sanctioned in the EPA construction.
The instances of (19) that are metonymically motivated are sanctioned by this function of the
EAN construction. Such a functional difference between the EAN construction and the EPA
construction is the crucial factor of acceptability of the expressions shown above.1J
Figure 5(a) depicts the metonymic schema discussed in this section. Notice in Figure 5(a)
that X is not the inherent property of the unprofiled participant (active zone). Y indicates the
unprofiled participant whose health condition is evoked by the profiled participant X. Figure
5(b) is the prototypical schema. Figure S depicts that (a) is a metonymic extension from (b).
<FigureS>
As the observations above show, the function of a construction and understanding of an
expression is deeply correlated, and should not be treated separately. Understanding a given
Healthy-N phrase is achieved through such cognitive processes as identification of a relevant
active zone within the range of discrepancy that is constrained by the construction. Examples
that are metonymically motivated as discussed in this section are hard to be captured with the
classical objectivist approach, since understanding of such instances requires conceptualization
U Questions such as how much discrepancy between a profile and an active zone that each construction sanctions are far
beyond the scope of this paper, and I will save such inquiries formy future \\'ork.
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that is based on the cognitive processes to read the relation of a profile and an active zone based
on the frames of words in question.
The classical objectivist approach also does not offer a plausible analysis about the
functional difference between the EAN construction and the EPA construction with respect to
the discrepancy between profile and active zones as presented in this paper, since, as mentioned
earlier, the logical and generative approaches ignore such a functional difference between the
two constructions.
This section discussed examples that differ from the schemas analyzed in section 3 in terms
of functional differences in the construction. There are some other examples that should not
be analyzed by the active-zone analysis by Langacker (l991b). The next section studies such
examples.
4.3. Involvement of event frames
This section discusses examples that elaborate constructional schemas related to causational
events. Consider the examples below.
(23) a. In addition to these advantages it possesses a perfectly healthy climate and a
perennial supply of water which flows in abundance from the many springs
round. [History of Rome: 42.54]
b. Walking. cycling and swimming arc healthy exercise which can help keep
the patient's blood pressure down, if he does them sensibly, without putting
himself under undue pressure. [BNC: ASO 479)
c. Give her simple, healthy food. [Secret garden: 150)
The semantic structure of the examples in (23) is IX that is a source ofY's being/becoming free
from illness] (X=referent, Y=unprofiled participant). This is different from the semantic structure
of the prototypical schema and also the metonymically motivated schema as discussed in the
preceding section.
As well as the examples in (19), the examples in (23) are metonymic expressions. Yet, we
cannot treat the examples in (23) as we did those in (19), since interpretation of instances as in
(23) requires frame knowledge about relevant causational events and the search for relevant
active zones, unlike in (19) where the relation of the profiled reference point and the active zone
in question is a part-whole relation, and does not involve an event frame.
It might appear that the examples in (23) elaborate the metaphorical schema introduced in
3.2, since the head noun referents are categorized as NONLIVING THING. This is, however, not
the case. They all elaborate the causational schema. For example, healthy food means "food that
keeps one healthy" (Le., food that is good for a person), not "food that is functioning well being
free from troubles".
Figure 6 depicts the metonymic schema related to causationaJ construal in the Healthy-N
construction. In this figure, X indicates CAUSER and YCAUSEE. Y is the unprofiled participant
who is evoked by the HEALTH frame and whose good health is kept/ caused by X.
The notion CAUSER is not monolith. For example, there is a subtle semantic difference
between such instances as healthy food and healthy exercise. The former presupposes the food
itself to be free from decay (thus, eating such food leads the eater to be in the state free from
illness). In the latter, such a presupposition is not to be found. An exercise itself cannot be free
from illness or any practical problems. Such a difference as to the notion CAUSER between
the two instances is that the former denotes "retaining" causation while the latter denotes
"result-oriented" causation. The causational effects on the causee are stronger in the latter. The
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difference between the two is also dependent on the conceptualizer's subjective categorization.
The construal operations on causation depend on folk physics or force dynamics (for the notion
"force dynamics", see Talmy 1988).
<Figure 6>
T----------+~
I mentioned in 3.2 that there are instances in the HeaIthy-N construction that elaborate a
different schema, even if the referent is categorized as NONLIVING THING such as exercise.
As shown in (23b), healthy exercise elaborates the result-oriented schema, rather than state-
oriented as in the instances in (15) and (16) do. What is the underlying mechanism of choosing
a particular constructional schema? In the remainder of the section, I will discuss this problem
focusing on instances in (23) that elaborate the metonymic schema.
I argue that selection of a constructional schema in the Healthy-N construction depends
on whether one categorizes the referent as CAUSER or SUBSTANCE based on the frame
semantics of words. Categorization of an object depends on the conceptuaIizer's subjective
conceptualization. Each object has various semantic aspects that are given by the frame-semantic
knowledge. For example, in the case of exercise (as in healthy exercise), its semantic aspects would
include "good for one's health", "conducted by human beings", "takes body movement" and
so on. Info~mation processing is achieved by detecting a semantic aspect of the object that the
conceptualizer regards as most relevant to meet his/ her purposes for interpretation and / or
communication with other speakers. In the examples of (23), the conceptualizer categorizes each
object as CAUSER by detecting its causational aspect from various alternatives each object has.
Detecting such a causational aspect leads to interpretation of the examples on a causation scale
that says that X makes Y healthy. The reason why the examples discussed in section 3 elaborate
a different schema is that the conceptualizer picks up an aspect "substance", not "causer", from
the various potential semantic aspects the referents contain.
Interpretation of the Healthy-N construction requires the help of the knowledge about
the HEALTH frame. One interprets the instances of (23) by searching the HEALTH frame and
detecting a causational aspect of the object that s/he regards as most informative and relevant.
Understanding expressions involves search of th~ frames about relevant events for a relevant
aspect. This is not limited to the Healthy-N construction. For example, sad story means "a
story that makes one feel sad", not "a story that is (feels) sad". Here again, as well as in (23), a
similar categorization process operates. The conceptualizer takes story as a causer based on the
knowledge about the SADNESS frame, which tells that a story can cause one to feel sad. This
leads one to activate the relevant causational schema.
Elaboration of a constructional schema concerns the semantic aspect that the
conceptualizer detects from a given object. Detection of a particular semantic aspect shows
certain tendency, which reflects the frame-semantic knowledge of the conceptualizer about the
object. In the case of healthy food, the reason that it normally elaborates the causational schema is
that the conceptualizer picks up a particular semantic aspect ofjood that is not a substance, but
a causer that keeps or makes one free from illness. It elaborates the schema, since, as opposed to
such instances as society, ecosystem, or fuel cell as introduced in 3.2, for the conceptualizer such an
121
122 Yoshikata Shibuya: Semantic Compositionality and Construal Operations
aspect of a causer is more important and directly informative when s/he perceives food than an
aspect as a substance.
Such tendency as to categorization of an object is also reflected in acceptability. Some
instances such as healthy chair or healthy bicycle are more easily understood than those such as
healthy photos or healthy toilet, for the former are more readily associated with the HEALTH frame
which tells us that these items are used in order to make/keep people healthy. Whether the
conceptualizer takes an object as SUBSTANCE (something that is in the state of being healthy)
or as CAUSER (something that is a causer to make causee healthy) is determined subjectively.
There are instances that elaborate either the prototypical schema or the causational schema,
although the referent is categorized by the traditional categorization theory as UVING THING.
See the examples in (24), where healthy bade/ia is construed either as a substance or a causer,
according to the context it occurs in.
(24) a. The bacteria are exposed to the toxic sample, and the amount of light they
emit is measured by a photometer. Healthy bacteria will emit a greater
amount of light, so the amount of light measured indicates the health of the
bacteria, and thus the toxicity of the sample. [http://www.geocities.com/
sciencelives/ rnicrotox.
htm!] (found in the GCXJGLE search engine)
b. Antibiotics kill our healthy bacteria as well as the unhealthy bacteria and the
yeasts are resistant to antibiotics. [www.holistichelp.net/newsletter9.html)
(found in the COOGLE search engine)
Such examples as healthy bacteria clearly show the involvement of the construal operations
based on the frame-semantic knowledge about bacteria and its effect on elaborating a relevant
constructional schema. Healthy bacteria can elaborate either the prototypical schema or the
causational schema, since the frame about the word bacteria allows the conceptualizer to
categorize it either as a substance or a causer.
The findings here cannot be properly captured with the objectivist approach based on
the traditional theory of categorization. The symbolic semantic view does not capture flexible
conceptualization. The facts discussed in this section can be captured with the frame-semantic
approach, since it suggests that the conceptualizer detects a relevant aspect of an object based
on his/her frame-semantic knowledge about the world.
5. Notes on the function of constructions
In 4.2, I mentioned that the EAN construction sanctions a bigger discrepancy between the
profile and the active zone than the EPA construction. The difference of discrepancy concerns
metonymic understanding of expressions. Metonymic expressions seem to be more readily
sanctioned by the function of the EAN construction, but not by the EPA construction. This
section discusses in more detail the functional difference between the two constructions.
Consider the follOWing examples that show that the examples in (23) elaborating the




'The climate is healthy.
*This exercise is healthy.
This food is healthy.
The fact that acceptability of (25c) is higher than (25a-h) is ascribed to the difference that healthy
food presupposes the food to be free from decay, whereas healthy exercise and healthy climate do
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not (recall the argument about the two sub-classes of CAUSER in 4.3).1~
What is the implication of (25)? I argue that it supports the arguments that the EPA
construction sanctions a narrower range of discrepancy than the EAN construction. In the
former construction, the metonymic sense is less permissible than the latter construction. The
EAN construction sanctions a wider range of discrepancy between the profile and the active
zone than the EPA construction. The prototypical sense of an adjective occurs both in the EAN
and EPA constructions, while the extended sense tends to occur in the EAN construction.
Not only metonymic expressions but also metaphorical expressions as given in (15) and






!This society is healthy.
!The ecosystem is healthy.
IThis business is healthy.
!Those fuel cells are healthy.
Of course, as is well known in the metaphor theory in cognitive linguistics, it is not the case that
the EPA construction never sanctions any metaphors. See the examples in (27).
(27) a.
b.
Your claims are indefensible. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 4)
The argument is shaky. (Lakoff and Johnson 1980: 46)
As Clausner and Croft (1997) argue, metaphors vary in their degree of semantic schematicity.
That is, "[d]omain relations function as generalizations over specific metaphorical expressions"
(Clausner and Croft 1997: 247). That the expressions in (26) are infelicitous stems from the
schematicity of the metaphorical schemas of the Healthy-N construction. Metaphors with small
conceptual gaps between the source domain and the target domain can be interpreted as in (27).
Conversely, in (26) the conceptual gap between the two domains is too big for one to understand
them metaphorically. Here, we will not discuss the schematicity of metaphorical expressions of
this construction any further. Yet, the facts presented in (26) and (27) suggest that the arguments
in this paper are plausible, since acceptability of metaphors, as well as metonymic expressions,
depends on the degree of inherence of the property. The prototypical sense of healthy occurs
both in the EAN and EPA constructions, while metaphorical and metonymic expressions are
more restricted. I ascribe this to the constructional properties.
Croft's (2001) Radical Construction Grammar (RCG) uses only taxonomic relations to
characterize any type of grammatical generalizations. Conversely, in reductionist construction
grammar (e.g., Kay and Fillmore 1999), it is argued that an element can be part of more than
one construction. For example, in a reductionist construction grammar, it is argued that
the part of the Intransitive Construction labeled VERB can also be a part of the Transitive
Construction.~ The crucial characteristic of the ReG approach to grammatical generalizations
is that its description is based on categorization. Unlike reductionist construction grammar and
other formal syntactic theories such as generative grammar, RCG takes the categories of the
construction characterized by the construction itself.
For example, Croft (2001) depicts the taxonomic hierarchy of argument structure
constructions as in Figure 7. The broken lines link the construction parl" and the heavy lines link
.. That (250) is aooeptable does nol mean that het1I11'!f jaad elaborates the prototypical sohema. As argued in 4.3, il
elaborates the oausalionalschema, by virtue of the semantio aspecl the conoeptualizer dcte<:ts.
's For more detailed discussions regarding the difference between RCG and rcductionist construotion gramm"r models,
."" Croft (2001: chapler I).
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<Figure 7>
-Croft (2001: 56)
The taxonomic hierarchy in Figure 7 shows how RCG represents categories. In this figure, it
describes constructions of English that represent the encoding of arguments of predicates. RCG
claims that the categories of the construction are characterized by the construction itself. Note
that each construction part in this figure is given its own category label. Each construction has
its own schema, varying from others in generality and specificity. As Croft notes, the actual
existence of the construction schemas is an "empirical question", and "can only be answered by
the principles discovered by the usage-based model" (Croft 2001: 57). RCG takes categorization
seriously, and seeks linguistic descriptions that are empirically and psychologically realistic. The
claims of RCG are indeed well supported by various pieces of empirical evidence, ranging from
typological studies to child language acquisition and historical development of language. I '
This paper follows the RCG approach to characterize the category of the Healthy-N
construction. Following the convention of Croft's RCG, I depict the taxonomic hierarchy of the
EAN construction and the EPA construction, as in Figure 8. Figure 8 depicts how the different
senses of healthy are motivated by the construction. Th.is figure prOVides the Modifier Modified
construction as a superordinate construction, in which the English Modifier-Noun (EMN)
construction is included. Figure 8 also shows that the EMN construction involves the English
Noun-Noun (ENN) construction (e.g., stone house) and the EAN construction that are both in
the taxonomic relation with it. 17 The figure also provides a taxonomic hierarchy of argument
structure constructions, in which the EPA construction is included. The functional difference
between the EAN construction and the EPA construction derives from the constructional
category to which they belong.
.. For its validity and the methodological background of Radical Construction Grammar, see the discussion by Croft
(2001: 1.6)
" Shibuya (2000) argued that the E\!N construction also involves v.lCious other constructions such as the English
Adjecti,oal Past Participle·Noun construction (e.g .• broren ""neifs). See Shibuya (in preparation) for more detailed
analy""" of the E.'-L'J construction.
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L _
H.: healthy, I: prototypical schema (physical/mental health), 2: metaphorical schema (function of the referent), 3:
metonymic schema ("part.whole"), 4: metonymic schema rcausational")
In Figure 8, the box in dotted line indicates that the two schemas of the EAN and EPA
constructions share the similar sense of healthy. The box in broken line indicates that ltealthy in
the EAN construction includes the prototypical sense and some nonprototypical senses (in this
case, metonymic and metaphorical senses) that are not shared by the EPA construction. The box
shown by long broken lines indicates the overall semantic category of ltealthy, i.e., the overall
distribution of ltealthy in these two constructions. In this figure, we only limit attention to limited
senses of healthy, so it is important to note that the figure does not attempt to cover extensive
cases of the semantics of this adjective.
As mentioned in 4.2, Langacker's active-zone analysis of the EAN construction would treat
the metonymic sense of healthy as a new predicate type whose trajector is the active zone of
the real denotation of the predicate. One cannot, however, use such an analysis for metonymic
senses, because the active-zone analysis does not account for the infelicity of such a metonymic
sense in the EPA construction. As well as metaphors, the origin of the metonymic senses should
be ascribed to the functional properties of constructions. The adjective healthy in the examples
elaborating the causational schema docs not get a metonymic reading "to make the referent
of the noun healthy" on its own. It gets such a sense from the EAN construction. Likewise,
the examples in (19) elaborating the "part-whole" schema get the metonymic senses from the
construction.
Why does the EAN construction sanction metonymic senses that are not available
in the EPA construction? I argue that the fact that the EAN construction allows a wider
range of discrepancy between the profile and the active zone than EPA construction reflects
communicative economy of the EAN construction for being such a small construction consisting
of a modifier and a head noun. Compared to the EPA construction that can be added more
components, the EAN construction is a "closed" construction, whose meaning denoted by the
limited number of components should be identified with the help of flexible conceptualization
processes based on the frame knowledge. The EAN construction urges one to seek the frames
evoked by the head noun for a relevant active zone in a more extensive way than the EPA
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construction. What matters is the function of the construction, through which one attempts to
resolve discrepancy between a profile and an active zone using the frame knowledge of words
in question.
The constructional approach to semantic compositionality as discussed in this section is
preferable than the objectivist approach that misses the functional difference between the two
constructions. In 2.1, I mentioned the case of hilfJPY student and happy suggestion. One can say the
shldent is happy but cannot say the suggestion is happy. Given the discussion above, we are now
able to analyze the semantics of such examples as follows. That is, the conceptualizer interprets
the metonymic sense of happy in happy suggestion by searching the HAPPINESS frame for an
unprofiled participant (Y) who becomes happy by the suggestion. It is the EAN construction
that urges the conceptualizer to search the frame in an extensive way for a relevant active zone.
Succeeding in identifying an appropriate active zone leads to the activation of the relevant
causational schema.
6. Conclusion
This paper discussed the semantics of the Healthy-N construction. The objectivist approach
presupposes symbolic view of meaning that suggests that interpretation of expressions is
conducted independently of conceptualization. I argue, based on the arguments as presented in
this paper, that such a symbolic approach cannot capture semantic compositionality of the EAN
construction in an empirically plausible way, since interpretation of this construction involves
flexible construal operations of the conceptualizer as we observed.
Construal operations of an expression show a probabilistic pattern. It is not the case that all
speakers interpret a given EAN construction in the same way (recall examples such as healthy
bacteria). Conceptualization is a central aspect of semantics, and such an aspect can be captured
with the frame-semantic approach.
As well as the frame-semantic approach, one of the main features of this paper was to
provide a constructional approach to semantic compositionaJity. By capturing a functional
difference between the EAN construction and the EPA construction as to the range of
discrepancy between a profile and an active zone that is sanctioned by the construction itself, I
have shown that the constructional approach provides a more fined-grained description of the
EAN construction than the objectivist approach and Langacker's (1991b) active-zone analysis.
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Sources of Examples
1. Apollo 13 = Apollo 13. Transcript
2. BNC = The British National Corpus
3. Conflict = Phillips, David Graham: The conflict
4. English traits = Emerson, Ralph Waldo: English traits
5. History of Rome = Livius, Titus: The history of Rome, Vol. VI
6. Secret garden = Burnett, Frances: The secret garden
7. Two cities = Dickens, Charles: Tale of two cities
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